Capstone results and conclusions from research of and interactions with cryptocurrency platforms relevant to the US Federal District Court case Clayton et al v Does, 2:24-cv-00182-JLR, Western District of Washington, Documents 34 and 30. January 2025.
Christopher Clayton
01/28/2025
Binance-related findings from Document 34
The following was rendered as part of a Court Application and thus includes legal assertions related to the case, but is largely a summary of facts and corporate governance conclusions from an investigation of Binance.com's corporate structure; including a summarization of jurisdictional laws found to be consistent with the structure, contrary to counter-assertions.
I. Binance-related BACKGROUND
1. Plaintiff 2 filed initiating documents with the Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre via email toward solving a claim for the disclosure of Binance.com user data from Binance Holdings Limited (signed Application for Arbitration under Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre's Short Form Rules, Statement of Claim, copy of and reference to relevant Binance Terms of Use/Privacy Policy). Binance.com's Terms of Use for users asserts HKIAC as its venue for arbitration, and also defines it as the jurisdictional seat under Hong Kong law explicitly (paragraph 32). Plaintiff 2 specifically made a claim for an equitable remedy (discovery) as a third party under Binance's Privacy Notice which states that Binance will cooperate with third parties over user data when it involves legal processes, seemingly contradicting another Terms of Use clause that states third-parties (relative to Binance users) cannot even claim equitable remedies from Binance, let alone damages. This resulted in filing arguments over the validity of asserting a third-party claim of benefits under such a contract (expansion of arguments and citations begun in Documents 5, 18, 23).
2. HKIAC assigned a case number HKIAC/A24313 on December 6th, 2024. Plaintiff 2 (as Claimant) sent the 'Letter to the Parties' outlining the assigned case number and the other initiating documents (comprising in total a Notice for Arbitration) on December 6th, 2024 via USPS registered mail # RB780951545US to Binance Holdings Limited's known registered agent (Appleby Global Services as of August 7th, 2024; Document 11-4), as well as an electronic copy to Appleby's current email address for its Cayman Islands office at www.global-ags.com on December 9th, 2024. Plaintiff 2 also supplied Document 11-4 (Cayman Registry search) to the case administrator. The mailed version of the documents arrived to Appleby on January 8th, 2025.
3. In the administrative communications via email between Plaintiff 2 (as Claimant), Binance Legal and the case administrators (before the assignment of an arbitrator), Binance Legal in effect simultaneously asserted that Nest Services Limited in the Republic of Seychelles is the only targetable entity for remedies per the Binance.com Terms of Use and that equitable pre-trial remedies were then not subject to arbitration through the HKIAC because Seychelles does not allow the taking of pre-trial evidence (Hague Evidence Convention Article 23 full exclusion). This served as Binance's first actual response to Plaintiff 2 in any manner over all of his attempts at contacting Binance both before and during this case.
4. The arbitration process sought a monetary award only on a conditional level if Binance failed to produce information about user identities that it should have collected and stored according to both its home jurisdiction's anti-money laundering Statute, as well as the arbitration jurisdiction's equivalent Statute, besides recovery of costs to arbitrate. Both jurisdictions also have Statutory exceptions in their data privacy laws for disclosure of data.
5. Binance Legal stood by a face-value reading of Binance's Terms of Use on January 10th, 2025 in a response Letter (that third parties cannot claim benefits per paragraph 36.9 and that Binance Holdings Limited is not targetable under the Terms). Plaintiff 2 as Claimant had already anticipated the core arguments on a balance of interests, aggravating factors and framework consistency basis in the arbitration Claim document. HKIAC responded a few days later that it would initiate a preliminary review of jurisdictional competency over the entire subject matter in its own Letter.
6. On January 21st 2025, the HKIAC stated in another Letter that it would need a deposit to even determine jurisdiction (admin fees as well as an arbitrator fee in line with its 'emergency arbitrator' total; $200k HKD), shared by both Parties, without providing a reason but where 'unused' money would be refunded. This well exceeded its Small Claims and 'Documents Only' procedures maximum (capped) arbitrator fee (rather in-line with its fees for a $4m HKD case; ~$500,000 USD), where Plaintiff 2 intentionally capped the total conditional damages to $50,000 USD. This remained the same fee quote as the previous Letter.
7. Plaintiff 2 asked to pause the case to seek an opinion from the Grand Court Cayman Islands concerning disclosure from Binance Holdings Limited as a separate legal process if it would help simplify the case for the fee basis (legal process to support arbitration). Binance had indicated previously that it wanted a determination of jurisdiction from HKIAC before any more resources were put into the matter, to which Plaintiff 2 in effect agreed.
8. On January 23rd, 2025, HKIAC agreed that it could suspend the arbitration case pending desire by any Party to re-open it, but didn't elaborate if any further Court decisions could lower the deposit or any explanation concerning the basis for such a deposit requirement.
9. Plaintiff 2 began Grand Court Cayman Islands case # G2025-0004 with an attempt at filing a Writ of Summons (Form 1) directed at Persons Unknown (pseudonymous Binance.com users) toward achieving injunctive relief from Binance Holdings Limited as a third party in support of the W.D. Wash. case and arbitration proceeding, and toward freezing relevant Binance.com custodial assets for potential eventual common law debt collection. This entailed registering a Cayman 'jurisdiction address' where Plaintiff 2 utilized a Cayman virtual mailbox service for such purposes (10 Market Street, Unit #2157 Grand Cayman, KY1-9006).
10. However, because a primary basis for judicial action directly in the Cayman Islands is not necessarily viable at this point (executing potential eventual common law debt collection from Binance.com custodial accounts still in existence), because the Grand Court has now calculated an Ad Valorem filing fee of ~$600 KYD based on the liquidated damages claim besides standard filing fees for every initiating document and pleading (~$200 KYD each) and because of complications related to filing 'applications by affidavit' (swearing in of documents by a Clerk of Court or Justice of the Peace where Plaintiff 2 is not in the jurisdiction), Plaintiffs have opted for pursuing a cross-judicial Letter of Request for now. Without identified Defendants, the total filing process is more complex (including amendment of the Writ later), alongside whether an international wire to pay for the total intended number of actions at once could be done or not. Requesting the Grand Court's ex parte judicial review for injunctive relief would require applying for leave of Court to be able to apply by affidavit for such a review in the first place (Form 53).
II. Binance-related FUNDAMENTAL BASIS FOR EXECUTION OF LETTER OF REQUEST BY W.D. WASH. IN CROSS-JUDICIAL ACTION
1. Central Authorities of third-party beneficial owners of cryptocurrency platforms that Plaintiffs find relevant to this case have consistently either rebuffed or ignored Hague Model Forms for pre-trial evidence that Plaintiffs have sent to them directly by email, with available feedback essentially stating that the originating Court must submit such requests.
2. The Court (W.D. Wash.) ordered Plaintiffs to show in law why it should be involved approving and executing Letters of Request for pre-trial evidence to relevant Central Authorities.
3. At a fundamental level, the Court can approve, sign and submit (execute) Letters of Request in civil litigation matters per Article 1 of the Hague Evidence Convention (a Contracting State may send a Letter of Request to another Contracting State so long as it meets the legal provisions of the recipient State). The United States' Central Authority (Department of Justice's Office of International Judicial Assistance) requires that judicial authorities handle outgoing requests per the Hague Convention's website (fundamentals of how the United States participates in the Evidence Convention; https://www.hcch.net/en/states/authorities/details3/?aid=528). This is in essence codified in 28 U.S. Code § 1781(b)(2) (Department of State can only receive requests, but that this does not preclude 'the transmittal of a letter rogatory or request directly from a tribunal in the United States to the foreign or international tribunal, officer, or agency to whom it is addressed and its return in the same manner').
4. The request intake body acting for the Central Authority of Binance Holdings Limited's jurisdiction is the Clerk of the Courts of the Cayman Islands (meeting Article 2; establishment of a channel for the submission of requests). Its email address is established on the Hague Convention's official website under the United Kingdom's Other Authorities page; https://www.hcch.net/en/states/authorities/details3/?aid=681 for clerkofcourt@judicial.ky. The Cayman Islands accepts requests for pre-trial evidence so long as they are specific and that evidence likely exists in the jurisdiction (qualified exclusion of Article 23 as discussed in Document 9). The evidence which justifies requesting pre-trial data reasonably held by the Binance platform was submitted with Document 5 (Document 5-2 Chase bank account statements; 5-3 Coinbase ledger outlining purchases and transfers; 5-4 screenshot of matching fraudulent website ETH address where transfers were sent; 5-6, 5-7 professional trace reports from Cybertrace regarding the relevant Binance platform transaction IDs).
5. Article 3 specifies what is required in a Hague Evidence Request, including the judicial act to be performed and the target of the pre-trial request. The standard Hague Model Form available on HCCH.org (https://www.hcch.net/en/publications-and-studies/details4/?pid=6560) fits these requirements (Document 9-3 original draft). Plaintiff 2 has been utilizing English to meet the Cayman Islands' language requirements (Article 4).
III. Binance-related BASIS IN UNITED STATES CASE LAW; BINANCE CORPORATE ORGANIZATIONAL EVIDENCE
1. Article 9 states that the authority executing such a Letter can use its own laws in justifying the request. In Document 6, the Court already found discovery from the Binance.com platform to be relevant and had authorized registered mail to Binance Holdings Limited in Document 10, all within a scope of document production consistent with US case law precedent.
2. Binance is known to US Federal District Courts regarding its anti-money laundering regime's practices which overlapped with events in controversy. Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Zhao et al, Northern District of Illinois, Document 80, 14th December 2023 regarding fines handed down to Binance Holdings Limited for its intentional lack of money controls on the platform where Cayman branches of government assisted in procuring evidence, putting into effect FinCEN Consent Order Number 2023-04. Further, United States v. Binance Holdings Limited, 2:23-cr-00178-RAJ, W.D. Wash., Document 1, 14th November 2023 (Complaint) reviewed US Federal investigative findings as to how Binance Holdings Limited intentionally internally thwarted or made a façade out of any money controls it did maintain as part of Binance.com's operations through October 2022, where Binance pled guilty to all counts including running an unlicensed money transmission business (Document 35). Notably in Document 23, page 24 (Plea Agreement), Binance agreed that any purchaser of the company, any subsidiary or any consolidated successor entity must also abide by stipulations to maintain a functioning anti-money laundering program and to continue reforming the platform's corporate structure regarding material operational concerns.
3. It has also been noted how Binance has still flouts any authority as an international comity factor, where Malta particularly denied regulatory power over Binance regarding its Malta entity and where Binance's significant use of US infrastructure was noted; e.g., Williams v. Binance, No. 22-972 (2d Cir. 2024), 8th March 2024; pages 5, 15-23.
4. Plaintiffs still contend that Binance Holdings Limited is a relevant entity to target for third-party discovery/disclosure regarding a non-privileged scope of user data. Binance Holdings Limited is an off-shore company in that it is not domestic to the Cayman Islands (attached to a registered agent). However, there is no accompanying relative on-shore corporate office address in another jurisdiction (no ownership entity in the same location as corporate officers), no other subsidiary/affiliate as such that can be said to handle operation of the www.binance.com platform's custody and trade service overall, nor any other relevant subsidiary/affiliate where Binance Holdings Limited cannot otherwise handle this specific situation. All corporate officers are in multiple unrelated jurisdictions working through its personhood (e.g., the current CEO is domiciled in Singapore, and the Co-Founder/Chief Customer Service Officer is domiciled in the United Arab Emirates). Its primary geofencing entity described as the 'controller' of 'Binance Affiliates' (all other geofencing entities listed in the Privacy Notice page) in Binance.com's current Terms of Use paragraph 37(g), which Plaintiff 2 never saw mentioned on the Binance.com website during the events in controversy of Clayton et al., Nest Services Limited, is in itself a relative off-shore company (likely an international business company registration with a registered agent in a similar way as it doesn't appear in the Republic of Seychelles' domestic company registry). Regardless, Binance Holdings Limited in the Cayman Islands is the only entity that can be concluded as the Binance.com platform's overall holding company (Registrant of the USPTO trademark for 'BINANCE' and founding ownership entity) and beneficial owner of the Binance.com platform.
5. Plaintiff 2 cannot find the incorporation document for Nest Services Limited on fsaseychelles.sc or elsewhere online, and an archive for Binance.com's Terms of Use during events in controversy doesn't list the company (22nd June 2022 version, archived from 22nd August 2022: https://web.archive.org/web/20220822172931/https://www.binance.com/en/terms). It is clear that Binance Holdings Limited was registered as the site's original ownership entity; 12th September 2017 incorporation date. These previous Terms state that Binance's relevant 'operator' entity for a given user is subject to change in paragraph 2, and Binance clearly created various geofencing entities later on that principle, including an off-shore 'controller,' but such broad stipulations are inconsistent with the structural fact that the original overall beneficial ownership registration is in one jurisdiction and this has remained consistent (Cayman Islands).
6. Further, if the corporate structure were to suddenly designate 'operator' or 'controller' status of the platform to another off-shore jurisdiction that cannot be described as the de facto principal place of business of the platform by any reasonable criteria, this would in practice allow Binance to create selective alternative jurisdictional moats over specific topics without any other substantive basis in contradiction to legal standards in the ultimate beneficial owner entity's jurisdiction and the platform's seat of arbitration's jurisdiction, effecting potentially unlimited protections on certain topics while retaining the benefits of the original jurisdiction. Binance could then keep changing jurisdictions thence over specific topics via further off-shore personhood extensions whenever desired without any form of consistency or basis in practical ownership and operational realities. Binance at that point had named the Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre as its seat for contract arbitration in the same way as its current Terms of Use, and the region's case law precedent and Statutes are consistent with the Cayman Islands.
7. The Republic of Seychelles in particular fully excludes Article 23 of the Hague Evidence Convention (no allowance for the taking of pre-trial evidence). This is not in-line with the legal standards of Binance Holdings Limited's jurisdiction (Cayman Islands), nor with Binance.com's seat of arbitration for user contract arbitration in its Terms of Use (HKIAC in Hong Kong). Data disclosure claims would not reasonably have a chance for review under Seychelle's applicable laws, whether by arbitration or Court procedure, besides that there is no reason to treat Nest Services Limited is a significant entity in this matter. This would place no jurisdictional limiting principle on Binance's protection from facing an otherwise tailored and evidence-backed claim for data disclosure while enjoying the benefits of the Cayman Islands' legal framework and Hong Kong's arbitration framework. Plaintiffs are not claiming a benefit overlapping with the Terms of Use in this case's context, but this statement generally comports with what non-privileged data disclosure as a legal standard would set out to accomplish.
8. The Republic of Seychelles has passed the Virtual Asset Service Providers Act 2024 which in paragraph 45B stipulates that virtual asset service providers must maintain information identifying transaction originators. The country's original Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism Act, 2020 paragraph 45 only stipulates that 'wire transmissions' need such customer data retained. International business companies can apply for a license per paragraph 6(3)(b), although it's unclear if Binance corporate officers are seeking such a license on behalf of Nest Services Limited. Paragraph 8(3) stipulates that such virtual asset service businesses must prominently display such licenses on their websites. Binance.com does not indicate if Nest Services Limited is so registered yet on its Terms of Use page. Presumably, Seychelles will regulate such activities even if unlicensed per paragraph 5. Regardless, Seychelles doesn't recognize pre-trial requests for evidence and its Data Protection Act only outlines that the Information Commission can pursue data disclosure from legal entities in paragraph 10.
9. Besides the off-shore Seychelles 'controller,' Binance as a platform now has multiple entities in the European Union representing a substantial subset of users. However, Binance Holdings Limited in arbitration has only claimed 'sole targetable entity significance around the Seychelles entity, consistent with its Terms of Use describing it as the primary platform 'controller' that manages all other geofencing entities and that it geofences 'all other users' not under other entities. During events in controversy when Binance.com didn't apparently maintain any such entities, it nevertheless warned in paragraph 5 of its July 2022 Privacy Notice (https://web.archive.org/web/20220818120438/https://www.binance.com/en/privacy) that Binance may transfer data outside of the European Economic Area in a manner compliant with domestic law. As the overall beneficial owner, Binance Holdings Limited should be able to work jointly with its other entities and data storage services that are not merely other off-shore personhoods and where all entities are ultimately affiliated with Binance.com as a website.
IV. Binance-related RELEVANT COMMONWEALTH CASE LAW, INCLUDING CAYMAN CASE LAW; CAYMAN STATUTES
1. Article 10 of the Hague Evidence Convention states that the authority receiving a request must apply appropriate measures of compulsion upon an entity in the same manner as it would in regards to an internal (domestic) case. As reviewed in part in Document 5, the Cayman Islands and the Commonwealth generally has its own set of case law precedent and Statutes in line with compelling relevant evidence from a third-party, where Courts in the Commonwealth legal tradition may cross-reference the body of case law in their decisions.
2. When Plaintiffs sent a US Federal District Court subpoena signed by W.D. Wash. to Binance Holdings Limited in the Cayman Islands as a third party, this action generally comported with Norwich Pharmacal disclosure standards even though subsequent reasoning in a US context didn't meet minimum contact standards with the US or Washington State as legal forums to establish W.D. Wash.'s personal jurisdiction over Binance to compel a response. Each set of specifically defined but currently pseudonymous user data exists on the Binance platform per trace evidence and Binance data policies, effectively exists in the Cayman Islands given that the beneficial owner of the platform is registered there which means it is subject to valid third-party data discovery even in support of foreign proceedings according to Cayman case precedent, and is sought in limited scope for the proportionate equitable relief of established fraudulent activity.
3. Norwich Pharmacal test criteria was affirmed as a valid mechanism for foreign-originating demands for discovery in Grand Court case precedent (e.g. ArcelorMittal USA LLC v Essar Global Fund Limited & or, Appeal No 15 of 2019, judged 3rd May 2021, page 28 for ‘equitable remedy in discovery' even toward a potentially foreign proceeding without requiring an Evidentiary Order).
4. In the United Kingdom's jurisdictional context, of which the Cayman Island's Grand Court may reference in case decisions (Commonwealth), AA v Persons Unknown & Ors, High Court of Justice, [2019] EWHC 3556 (Comm), paragraph 59, 13th December 2019 established precedent in the UK for cryptocurrency to be treated as intangible personal property (Bitcoin transferred to the Bitfinex platform via bribery).
5. Sally Jayne Danisz v (1) Persons Unknown (2) Huobi Global Ltd, High Court of Justice, [2022] EWHC 280 (QB), 20th January 2022 (private ex parte hearing) ordered Huobi Global Ltd (Seychelles) to disclose payment data tied to pseudonymous persons from the Huobi (HTX) cryptocurrency platform (Bitcoin transferred to HTX via fraudulent trade mechanisms).
a. That case built on a precedent of Disclosure Orders to non-UK legal entities for cryptocurrency platform data involving UK citizens' assets, e.g. Ion Science Ltd v Persons Unknown.
6. Chandler v Cape Plc, Court of Appeal, [2012] EWCA Civ 525, paragraph 80, 25th April 2012 established a knowledge and superior standing test for duty of care of a UK parent company for matters involving its subsidiaries (Plaintiff's exposure to asbestos as a subsidiary employee and the parent company's expertise in that subject).
a. Binance's de facto continuous principal place of business with registration in the Cayman Islands should be able to provide a duty of care in this controversy as a third party through direct access to Binance.com user accounts in controversy which is the basis of this Application, or to otherwise access such accounts through subsidiaries and third-party data companies that it may use regarding the ones that are not merely off-shore corporate personhood extensions. Binance's Terms do not state where data is stored, preventing a practical inference of subsidiary responsibility in that sense.
7. The Cayman Islands' Anti-Money Laundering Regulations (2023 Revision; previous most-recent revisions from 2020), paragraphs 36(2) describes general data collection and retention obligations around customers (all fund transfers); 49D(1) describes specific data retention obligations of virtual asset businesses. Paragraph 32 also states that even if a legal entity ('person') is not a licensee, the principal of the person must maintain record-keeping procedures. Such data which the company should have captured and maintained, as digital electronic data, has low marginal costs to store and it's expected that such a business would utilize relatively large amounts of total data storage as a cost of doing business. The Cayman Islands allows data disclosure under 'any other law' not otherwise specifically referenced in its Confidentiality Law (Cayman Islands Law 23 of 2016, paragraph 3(1)(j)).
V. Binance-related select SUMMARY OF KEY FACTS
The related cryptocurrency wallet, acting as a centralized exchange (also known as Binance 5 or 'Binance. DepositAndWithdraw' on various blockchain browsers) has experienced over 20m transactions. The amount of trade volume passing through it attests to Binance Holdings Limited acting as the beneficial owner of the world’s largest cryptocurrency exchange (trade fees derived from website protocol-mediated centralized valuation and trading of cryptocurrency as a fiat-valued asset). It would be unlikely that Binance would allow unrelated operations of such scale to use its trademark unchallenged, and the sheer scale matches Binance's market presence.
Binance Holdings Limited is the Registrant of USPTO serial # 87837417 for 'BINANCE' regarding cryptocurrency-related software. Its registered agent in the Cayman Islands as of August 7th, 2024 is the following (Id. Document 11-2, Cayman Islands General Registry search). Plaintiff 2 had sent a US subpoena and evidence packet to it which arrived on August 8th, 2024 (RB780950496US).
OKX-related findings from Document 30
The following was rendered as part of a Court Application and thus includes legal assertions related to the case, but is largely a summary of facts and corporate governance conclusions from an investigation of OKX.com's corporate structure; including a summarization of jurisdictional laws found to be consistent with the structure, contrary to counter-assertions.
I. OKX-related BACKGROUND
1. Central Authorities of third-party beneficial owners of cryptocurrency platforms that Plaintiffs find relevant to this case have consistently either rebuffed or ignored Hague Model Forms for pre-trial evidence that Plaintiffs have sent to them directly by email, with available feedback essentially stating that the originating Court must submit such requests.
2. The Court (W.D. Wash.) ordered Plaintiffs to show in law why it should be involved approving and executing Letters of Request for pre-trial evidence to relevant Central Authorities.
3. This Application is in regards to execute such a Letter to OKG Technology Holdings Limited's jurisdiction. OKG Tech has not voluntarily responded to a subpoena sent by registered mail and has not been found to be under the Court's personal jurisdiction (Document 24).
a. Discovery was ultimately accomplished with CEX.IO LTD via voluntary discussion.
b. Plaintiff 2 has so far opted for arbitration with Binance Holdings Limited under Binance.com's Terms of Use (Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre case # HKIAC/A24313 filed on December 6th, 2024, with the option of separate relevant legal action not overlapping with claiming a benefit from the contract in support).
c. Pursuit of the biitflyeir.com registrants' identities is still taking place in a delayed subpoena delivery process via USPS # 9589071052702259293650 to Domains by Proxy.
4. The Hong SAR's judicial system as an administrative matter asked Plaintiff 2 to submit personal identification either in person or via personal representative as part of 'final identification authorization' to be able to create an HK judiciary account as a Litigant in Person on January 6th, 2025. Ideally, Plaintiff 2 would use such an account to pursue Norwich injunctive relief from OKG Tech as a third-party Respondent, with a case ultimately centered around a claim on Persons Unknowns' OKX platform assets for Plaintiff 1. However, Plaintiff 2 cannot immediately determine whether notaries public or process servers would provide such services, or what other professions or agencies could handle such a task. In any event, a domestic case filing may not be accepted anyway because the subset of value taken to the OKX platform is less than $75,000 HKD (Hong Kong District Court's threshold). Hong Kong's Small Claims Tribunal as a filing alternative seems to be based on voluntary, informal proceedings where Defendants' identities are already known, which would not be suitable for this situation either. The value of the W.D. Wash. claim regarding OKX assets is also small for arbitration purposes compared to the Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre's fee of $8,000 HKD (~1,100 USD) for registration, plus more for assigning an arbitrator.
II. OKX-related BASIS FOR EXECUTION OF LETTER OF REQUEST BY W.D. WASH. IN CROSS-JUDICIAL ACTION
1. At a fundamental level, the Court (W.D. Wash.) can approve, sign and submit (execute) Letters of Request in civil litigation matters per Article 1 of the Hague Evidence Convention (a Contracting State may send a Letter of Request to another Contracting State so long as it meets the legal provisions of the recipient State). The United States' Central Authority (Department of Justice's Office of International Judicial Assistance) requires that judicial authorities handle outgoing requests per the Hague Convention's website (fundamentals of how the United States participates in the Evidence Convention; https://www.hcch.net/en/states/authorities/details3/?aid=528). This is in essence codified in 28 U.S. Code § 1781(b)(2) (Department of State can only receive requests, but that this does not preclude 'the transmittal of a letter rogatory or request directly from a tribunal in the United States to the foreign or international tribunal, officer, or agency to whom it is addressed and its return in the same manner').
2. The request intake body acting for the Central Authority of OKG Technology Holdings Limited's jurisdiction is the Chief Administration Office of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China (meeting Article 2; establishment of a channel for the submission of requests). Its email address is established on the Hague Convention's official website; https://www.hcch.net/en/states/authorities/details3/?aid=492 for enquiry@judiciary.hk. The Hong Kong SAR accepts requests for pre-trial evidence so long as they are specific and that evidence likely exists in the jurisdiction (qualified exclusion of Article 23 as discussed in Document 10). The evidence which justifies requesting pre-trial data reasonably held by the OKX platform was submitted with Document 5 (Document 5-2 Chase bank account statements; 5-3 Coinbase ledger outlining purchases and transfers; 5-4 screenshot of matching fraudulent website ETH address where transfers were sent; 5-7 professional trace report from Cybertrace regarding the relevant OKX platform transaction ID).
3. Article 3 specifies what is required in a Hague Evidence Request, including the judicial act to be performed and the target of the pre-trial request. The standard Hague Model Form available on HCCH.org (https://www.hcch.net/en/publications-and-studies/details4/?pid=6560) fits these requirements (Document 9-4 original draft). Plaintiff 2 has been utilizing English to meet the Hong Kong SAR's language requirements (Article 4).
4. Article 9 states that the authority executing such a Letter can use its own laws in justifying the request. In Document 6, the Court already found discovery from the OKX platform to be relevant and had authorized registered mail to OKG Technology Holdings Limited in Document 10, all within a scope of document production consistent with US case law precedent.
a. Plaintiffs still contend that OKG Tech is the immediate on-shore beneficial owner of the OKX platform, one of the platforms in controversy in this case, and thus OKG Tech reasonably has access to data that is able to identity relevant Doe Defendants (regardless of whether it needs to coordinate with subsidiaries, affiliates or third-party data storage partners to produce the information), making the Hong Kong SAR a relevant jurisdiction (OKG Tech's office is there). To summarize, its physical address has been used in USPTO trademark filings for the mark 'OKX' as it relates to cryptocurrency software; www.okg.com.hk states how OKG Tech is involved in custody and trade services, states that it has relevant licenses for such activity in the Hong Kong SAR with direct hyperlinks to www.okx.com; and OKX's Terms of Service do not indicate where exactly data is stored. OKG Tech also has an off-shore Cayman business registry (not the principal place of business as a result), and its own parent company is registered in the Cayman Islands (also off-shore relative to where its corporate officers and physical office address are located, where the on-shore address is most immediately related to the platform's operation as a practical matter. The Cayman Islands' legal framework is nevertheless similar). The CEO of OKG Tech is in the Hong Kong SAR, and so are OKX-brand officers (e.g., the Global Chief Commercial Officer for OKX).
b. OKG Tech formed from a reverse stock-listing buyout of LEAP Holdings Limited in 2020 and the previous Beijing-based on-shore company registration for the platform (Beijing Oukai Lianchuang Internet Technology Ltd.) subsequently went dormant as the platform's most recent significant on-shore jurisdictional change (principal place of business change). If the OKX platform's significant jurisdiction for all or select legal issues or claims could simply be changed to off-shore jurisdictions via shell companies that have no significance in corporate officer presence, overall ownership, trademark ownership or provable involvement in data storage while a clear on-shore principal place of business otherwise exists, this would not be indicative of a consistent legal or corporate framework (ability to unlimitedly shield the entire corporate structure from certain otherwise-legitimate claims). This would create the potential for inconsistencies with the OKX platform's seat of arbitration's laws and principal place of business' laws (Hong Kong SAR's laws in both circumstances). In such circumstances, there's no reason why the principal place of business could not hold responsibility for platform-related matters over an off-shore personhood extension. OKX.com's archived Terms of Service from 29th April 2022 (copy from 15th August 2022, overlapping with events in controversy) outlined the Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre as its mandatory seat for arbitrable claims in the same way as its current Terms, and claimed a still-extant Seychelles entity as its sole alleged 'operator,' whereas now there are multiple additional such entities attributed to different users by residency (https://web.archive.org/web/20220828093140mp_/https://www.okx.com/support/hc/en-us/articles/360021813691).
5. Article 10 of the Hague Evidence Convention states that the authority receiving a request must apply appropriate measures of compulsion upon an entity in the same manner as it would in regards to an internal (domestic) case. As reviewed in part in Document 5, the Hong Kong SAR has its own set of case law precedent and Statutes in line with compelling relevant evidence from a third-party, and this body of law is directly relevant to this case.
a. The Hong Kong SAR's Limitation Ordinance Part II, paragraph 4 sets the Limitations Period for tort claims at six years (inherited UK standard).
b. A request for pre-trial evidence from OKG Tech would be in-line with Evidence Ordinance (Cap. 8) paragraph 75(b) (evidence is meant to support a civil actionable cause already underway in a foreign Court), and paragraph 76(4) (specific information found to be accessible by OKG Tech in the technical evidence and corporate organization evidence is the substantive request). This is in essence a reiteration of the Hong Kong SAR's Article 23 qualified exclusion, which relates to Norwich injunctive relief standards inherited from the UK.
c. Cap. 615 Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist Financing Ordinance Schedule 2, Part 1, Division 2, paragraph 13(A)(2) requires virtual asset service providers to store information about customers. Schedule 1, Part 1, Division 2, paragraph 53F effectively enforces such requirements on entities conducting related activities even if they are unlicensed.
d. Re Gatecoin Limited (In Liquidation), Court of First Instance, [2023] HKCFI 914, paragraphs 8, 47-48, 57-59; 31st March 2023 held cryptocurrency to be intangible personal property in a Hong Kong SAR context.
e. Chan Yim Wah v New World First Ferry Services Ltd, Court of First Instance, HCPI820/2013, paragraphs 2, 26, 43, 85; 5th August 2015 sought in part from the non-party Hong Kong Marine Department the identity of the owner of the vessel involved in her personal injury claim after the Department's investigation of the related accident (analysis of Norwich Pharmacal disclosure from third parties in a lawsuit as it relates to the data privacy law, finding in favor of disclosure. This relevantly applies to Personal Data (Privacy) Ordinance, Part 5, Division 1, paragraph 19).
f. Yung Wai Tak Abraham William v Natural Dairy (NZ) Holdings Limited (in Provisional Liquidation), Court of First Instance, [2020] HKCFI 2067, paragraphs 47-49, 17th August 2020 highlights a test for parent company liability in the Hong Kong SAR over matters overlapping with a subsidiary; namely, background context including full range of documentary evidence and pattern of conduct as a contract (that Plaintiff's de facto double source of employment). Defendants in Clayton et al utilized the OKX platform, but attributing any off-shore OKX platform entity (such as Aux Cayes FinTech Co. Ltd.) for responsibility over transaction data is not reasonable as no apparent operational activity or data storage activity takes place at such business registrations, and no corporate officers are at such locations.
g. OKX platform email addresses have continually asserted to Plaintiff 2 that only the platform's Seychelles entity, now described as the geofencing entity for 'all other users' not otherwise handled by an OKX entity in a 'regulated' jurisdiction, can be targeted for remedies in this case (Aux Cayes FinTech Co. Ltd. in the Republic of Seychelles). However, Seychelles does not have laws consistent with the platform's immediate beneficial owner's jurisdiction. Fundamentally, the country completely excludes Article 23 of the Hague Evidence Convention for the taking of pre-trial evidence, besides the question of why a Seychelles entity is relevant when no corporate officers are there as opposed to the Hong Kong SAR office address (relative off-shore entity in comparison), and it is not an OKX trademark registrant in any way. It is not a principal place of business of the platform's core operations (custody and trade services) by any reasonable criteria, or in any other practical way (not a domestic Seychelles company as it is not in the country's domestic registry; likely is an international business company with a registered agent). If the off-shore Seychelles entity were considered to be operationally significant anyway as the 'only targetable' entity regarding platform user data, this would create a situation where the principal place of business (OKG Tech) is retained such that the benefits of that jurisdiction (Hong Kong) are selectively enjoyed while affording the overall corporate structure protection from claims over user activity via the off-shore registration's jurisdiction's laws (inconsistent framework). The only consistent, continuous corporate and legal framework for core trade and custody operations over the OKX platform can be traced through Beijing Oukai in Beijing followed by a reformation as OKG Tech in the Hong Kong SAR. Requests or demands routed to the Seychelles entity would be forwarded to officers in the Hong Kong SAR via the registered agent for it, and there's no reason for Seychelles' laws to apply in this case's circumstances.
h. The Republic of Seychelles has recently passed a Virtual Asset Service Providers Act 2024 for virtual asset businesses to attain and display a Seychelles virtual asset service provider license on their relevant websites (paragraph 8(3)), and this applies to international business companies (Aux Cayes cannot be found in Seychelles' domestic business registry). However, this law passed well after events in controversy and www.okx.com's Terms of Service displays no such license yet. In line with its pre-trial evidence stance, Seychelles also doesn't define a method of attaining data disclosure through civil legal processes. The country's Data Protection Act only outlines that the Information Commission can pursue data disclosure from legal entities in paragraph 10 (nothing concerning data disclosure via civil legal processes anywhere in the Act, whether in support of foreign proceedings or domestic). If the Seychelles entity were the 'only targetable entity,' this would afford the platform unlimited protection (no limiting principle) from civil pre-trial evidence disclosure claims because they would not be reasonably arbitrable claims under Seychelles' applicable laws, be reasonably litigable in Seychelles' Court system or be obtainable via a cross-judicial Letter of Request. If OKG Tech and the OKX platform could simply change to another off-shore jurisdiction again regarding which entity has responsibility for 'all other users' as soon as desired to switch from Seychelles' legal framework, this would still not be consistent with the current principal place of business's laws, nor with the seat of arbitration's laws (Hong Kong SAR). In the platform's previous form as OKEx, Beijing Oukai (the principal place of business at that point) undertook similar strategies such as registering an off-shore entity in Malta.
i. OKX.com is now associated with many more geofencing entities, nominal or otherwise, since the version of its Terms of Service as it stood during events in controversy (June 2022). In particular, OKEx's Malta entity was reformulated as OKX's entity responsible for European Union users as an organizational shift regarding a large category of users. In theory, that means data privacy laws and different stances on Hague Evidence Convention Article 23 may take primacy for EU users, where EU countries contradict the Hong Kong SAR's Article 23 stance (full versus qualified exclusion). However, there's no way to tell where users reside unless users are identified in the first place, and there's no evidence that the Malta entity, for example, is not simply an off-shore business registration like the Seychelles one (Malta has been noted as disclaiming regulation over other platforms with entities in Malta such as Binance.com; Williams v. Binance, No. 22-972 (2d Cir. 2024), 8th March 2024, page 21). OKX email addresses have never claimed any entity's significance in this situation besides Aux Cayes, anyway. There's also no reason to preclude the platform's overall on-shore beneficial owner (OKG Tech) from working with any OKX entities that are not merely off-shore corporate personhood extensions for data disclosure related to the platform. All the entities are affiliated with OKX.com as a single platform.
6. The disclosure of non-privileged personally identifiable data of limited scope as a legal process and as pre-trial evidence (either in US case law precedent; or in Hong Kong SAR Statutes, its Norwich precedent and its Hague Evidence Convention Article 23 qualified exclusions) lies outside of claiming a third-party benefit through the OKX platform's Terms of Service, which has a mandatory arbitration clause with the Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre as the seat of arbitration. Plaintiffs do not see a reason to undergo arbitration with OKG Tech currently for any potential claims that would likely lie inside such a contract (no significant aggravating factors yet to suggest that damage claims, or conditional damages claims, directly against OKG Tech as a benefit from the OXK platform's Terms (via fraudulent OKX users' contracts) are currently worthwhile or especially warranted).
OKX-related key facts select summary
The OKX exchange wallet involved in this transaction (referred to as OKX 1, OKX 7 and 'OKX. DepositAndWithdraw' in various blockchain browsers) has experienced over 1.7m transactions. If it were somehow not utilized by OKX.com, this would beg the question of why OKG Tech or its off-shore overall ownership parent entity in the Cayman Islands has not moved to shut down operations related to it or to take them over as part of trademark infringement action. The total transactions and their frequency are also in-line with OKX's status in the market for fiat-valued cryptocurrency (one of the largest cryptocurrency exchanges for such purposes).
CEX.IO summary from Document 5, where CEX.IO LTD ultimately cooperated with the case
Document 5 largely had to do with outlining technical evidence involved in the case as part of pursuing a grant of leave to subpoena relevant third parties, which did not delve into personal jurisdiction at that point. This segment solely concerns CEX.IO from a corporate structure perspective that was rendered as part of preliminary analysis of asserting which legal entity to most relevantly target for the pursuit of data disclosure, where CEX.IO LTD eventually voluntarily cooperated.
VII. CEX.IO – UK DOMESTICATION ANALYSIS
1. CEX.IO as a cryptocurrency trade platform (www.cex.io) is mixed up in this case on the technical evidence.
2. The website states that three entities are 'collectively managing the CEX.IO platform' and that a UK entity handles 'website operations' [CEX.IO Contacts page; bottom of site]. Plaintiffs find it relevant to pursue disclosure from the UK entity (CEX.IO LTD, incorporated 2013) via the same route (The Senior Master, Royal Courts of Justice).
CEX.IO LTD
3. The CEX.IO platform's associated entities cannot be distinguished by responsibility over particular users in a situation involving pseudonymous data from the publicly available details of the platform's geofencing regime. The bottom of the site broadly lists which entity 'serves' which basket of users by country/region, including one for 'customers all over the world' with exceptions. The Data Protection Officer email is the same for all users in its privacy pages.
4. The Anti-Fraud Department is described at the platform level as 'reporting findings' regarding users under the management of a singular Anti-Fraud Commissioner [CEX.IO anti-fraud page]. Section 5(a) indicates the maintenance of Know Your Customer data protocols with a review team assigned.
5. CEX.IO Support did not offer further clarification concerning how or if any one legal entity may have responsibility for the pseudonymous CEX.IO transaction ID in controversy (Exhibit R). The Legal email address referenced in this communication is the most relevant contact that Plaintiff 2 can find for electronic legal service.
6. CEX.IO LTD is the only entity with identifiable responsibility for platform operations as a whole, and thus for users who trade through the CEX.IO wallet represented by public key 0xdac17f958d2ee523a2206206994597c13d831ec7?..................... It is then liable to disclose user data at limited scope tied to the CEX.IO transaction ID in controversy for Plaintiffs' equitable relief in a UK Norwich context.
7. Chandler v Cape Plc, Court of Appeal, [2012] EWCA Civ 525, paragraph 80, 25 April 2012 established a knowledge and superior standing test for duty of care of a UK parent company for matters involving its subsidiaries (Plaintiff's exposure to asbestos as a subsidiary employee and the parent company's expertise in that subject).
a. Regarding Clayton et al, CEX.IO LTD knows or ought to know about Defendants' platform trade and transfer activities due to its responsibility for operations, especially given the platform's anti-fraud investigative protocols. All of the CEX.IO legal entities are associated with the same platform system and domain name; same relative business in every other respect. CEX.IO LTD is thus in position to provide proportionate equitable relief to third parties harmed by platform users.
Additional corporate structure analysis of CEX.IO prepared to optionally pursue action in a UK judicial context against platform user assets
6. The www.cex.io platform Terms of Use (https://cex.io/legal/terms) mandates US platform users to send a Notice to its US-based geofencing entity and engage in voluntary discussion over a 60-day period before mandatory arbitration through the American Arbitration Association (if needed) in order to resolve claims concerning any of the platform's associated legal entities. The victim of the underlying cause of the US Federal District Court case is a US citizen, but did not use the CEX.IO platform directly as part of this controversy. The identified Defendant platform user (Defendant in a US Federal District Court case for the underlying tort harm) in controversy is not a United States citizen or resident, either. The US Terms of Use only address third parties as far as holding the CEX.IO platform harmless in the event that the Terms change, and that users are barred from infringing upon the rights of third parties.
a. CEX.IO LTD could claim that Petitioner as a US third-party is claiming a benefit under the US user Terms of Use on behalf of the US citizen Plaintiff 1 of Clayton et al and thus that injunctive relief should be subject to voluntary Notice, followed by arbitration in Illinois if needed, resulting in a counter-claim for an anti-suit injunction in this Court (CEX.IO Corp (US) is located in Illinois). However, it has already been shown in Document 24 of Clayton et al that the Western District of Washington (a US venue in Washington State's jurisdiction) does not have personal jurisdiction over CEX.IO LTD as the beneficial platform owner. It would not make sense by extension that a US arbitration organization would have jurisdictional authority to decide injunctive relief involving a non-US user of the platform, especially because the CEX.IO platform's Illinois entity thus has no relevant involvement with that user unless it were proven to be an alter ego of CEX.IO LTD.
b. The Defendant user did not contract under CEX.IO Corp (US)'s Terms in any way due to not being a US citizen or resident; Defendant would have contracted under CEX OVRS LLC's (St. Kitts and Nevis) Terms (the geofencing entity for 'all other users' not otherwise under the responsibility of any other CEX.IO geofencing entities which handle users of specific jurisdictional regions, primarily concerning the European Union and the United States; not the People's Republic of China). CEX.IO LTD could then counter-claim that any third-party claims related to a user's contract with the platform under CEX OVRS LLC's geofencing responsibility are subject to claiming a benefit under that entity's Terms, but those Terms do not have a mandatory arbitration clause. Section 35 outlines a Limitations Period of one year to bring claims, which contradicts law in St. Kitts and Nevis in the first place (six years for contracts and torts; CAP 5.09 Limitation Law Part II(4)(2)). Claimant is asserting that CEX.IO LTD as the overall beneficial owner of the platform should be responsible to provide injunctive relief anyway (same limitations period of six years in UK legal standards). St. Kitts and Nevis is not even ascribed to the Hague Evidence Convention, so pre-trial requests for evidence cannot even be arbitrated or litigated in that jurisdiction, inconsistent with legal standards in CEX.IO LTD's jurisdiction (UK countries and territories are signatories of the Hague Evidence Convention and maintain a qualifying exclusion of Article 23 to allow specific and jurisdictionally probable pre-trial requests for evidence). Claimant would not even be able move through St. Kitts and Nevis to bring this claim. If Claimant could only file an Application through St. Kitts and Nevis which would have no chance of litigable legal standing, this would create an inconsistency in choice of legal framework where CEX.IO LTD would be claiming the benefit of the UK's legal framework as the beneficial platform owner while requiring various users and third-parties to bring claims through an entity in a jurisdiction without the same legal standards. Further, the Terms only address the rights of third parties insofar as the CEX.IO platform will be held harmless for any losses resulting from a change to the Terms, and that first parties are barred from harming third parties.
c. St. Kitts and Nevis' Proceeds of Crime Act Cap. 4.28 requires money transmission businesses to comply with provisions (paragraph 198), and provides guidelines for verifying customers such as name and physical address (paragraph 79). The country further seemingly allows in its Protection Act data disclosure by law or Court order (paragraph 19(b)(ii)), but simultaneously seemingly bars disclosure to third parties unless the data user voluntarily offers it (paragraph 9(b)). The latter uncertainty further creates incongruity with the platform's reasonably determined principal place of business's law (UK (England and Wales) law), besides that St. Kitts and Nevis is not ascended to the Hague Evidence Convention.
d. In any event, the cause of action is not directed at CEX.IO LTD or its beneficially owned platform; it is directed at assets held by Defendant on the platform. Disclosure relief in support of a foreign cause of action was already resolved through voluntary discussion. The personal information involving the transaction in controversy complied with storage expectations under The Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing and Transfer of Funds (Information on the Payer) Regulations 2017, paragraph 40(3), and under disclosure standards under Data Protection Act 2018 paragraph 94(6)(b) (information was disclosed without Defendant's consent by reason of technical evidence linking him to a fraud scheme). Even if the voluntary information release were said to be a Norwich disclosure, the properness of information disclosed via such discovery in potential support of a foreign-originating case and cause of action can be seen in Shlaimoun and another v Mining Technologies International Inc [2011] EWHC 3278 (QB). Though the properness of injunctive relief for foreign-contemplated causes of action served as the basis for the denial of Norwich relief in Green v CT Group Holdings Limited [2023] EWHC 3168 (Comm) (exclusiveness of the Hague Evidence Convention's Letter of Request process to execute foreign requests for evidence), this case filing is specifically against assets of Defendant's assets under the reasonable custodial control of a UK-based company (cause of action against those UK jurisdictional assets), and he has been identified already anyway.
e. In addition to the injunction request being directed at custodial assets and not CEX.IO itself or its directly owned assets, the legal standard for a proprietary injunction by a third-party lies outside of or supersedes any mandatory arbitration clause for users in the platform's Terms of Use, even if a relevant contract point under a mandatory arbitration clause could be identified (no reliance on claiming a third-party benefit under those Terms).
f. In the site's Terms of Use during events in controversy (12th August 2022 Terms archived on 14th August 2022; https://web.archive.org/web/20220814232858mp_/https://cex.io/terms), another entity CEX.IO Limited (Gibraltar) was also in use and apparently is not anymore (fell off the current Terms of Use). If the relevant entity for arbitrable or litigable claims related to CEX.IO platform users in 'non-regulated' jurisdictions could be changed on a whim to different off-shore registrations in different off-shore jurisdictions, this would further not be a consistent legal framework or provide any limiting principle for pursuing injunctions or other relief from CEX.IO as a third-party or from CEX.IO users' custodially-held assets (ability to protect itself unlimitedly from certain claims otherwise pursuable in the beneficial owner's jurisdiction).
Post-filing note on assertions related to the facts presented - 6/15/2023; updated 11/13/2025
I compiled these filings after it was found that personal jurisdiction from a minimum contact perspective in a US context did not apply because of the third-party nature of the entities relative to the case and because of their use of US DNS infrastructure not counting as constituting enough of a business presence in the United States. I went about another round of attempting to domesticate cases in other jurisdictions per my notes in the Research section of this website. I didn't see another choice, especially after I clarified in an amended Application in April 2025 what I felt was the Statutory basis to allow district courts to issue Writs in support of their jurisdictions and to transmit Letters of Request because the Court hasn't made a decision on that amended assertion yet. I had asserted the Court is not precluded from transmitting such Letters, even though the Department of State does not involve itself in such activities.
The cause of action in the sense of those spin-off controversies is rooted in a duty of care basis. That is, assertions that a duty of care exists to provide plausibly accurate data about users accused of tort harms and laundering even without prior relationships between the victim of the case (or myself) and the entities because of a Statutory basis to attain and retain such data, a contractual basis to attain and retain such data asserted as superseding any 'no third-party benefits' clauses, a case precedent basis and/or that a firm understanding of Know Your Customer standards has existed in the public mind at least since events in controversy.
However, these filings were primarily about showing how cryptocurrency businesses can create multiple off-shore personhood extensions and how this might be used to deflect legal or ethical responsibilities via assertions of needing to target this or that entity under this or that circumstances, in spite of the questions of corporate and legal framework consistency this invokes. This is exactly what occurred when attempting to communicate with these businesses, even regarding one that eventually cooperated, given that it attempted to deflect 'sole responsibility' to an off-shore company registration as well and ignored other communications I had sent prior to mailing a US subpoena. This is why I found value in documenting these particular entities' corporate structures from someone impacted by them (my dealing with the victim's circumstances toward finding a recovery solution regarding these entities' users/customers) even without regard to the eventual US Federal District Court case, and how their very web of corporate entities was used as an excuse to deny assistance without Court or government enforcement demands.
11/13/2025 - Because it has been made apparent from related endeavors that I've been undertaking that negligence claims may not be validly cognizable when there is not a specifically intended beneficiary under a stated authority for relief, this may apply particularly in the matter with Binance. I have been pursuing a Cayman Court case after arbitration was paused over the amount of fees demanded by the HKIAC, and the Cayman Islands' anti-money laundering laws don't have an explicit private right of action, let alone specifically intended beneficiaries when KYC failures occur by a financial institution (which includes money transmitters and includes virtual assets). The Writ I had submitted hadn't reached 'filed' status anyway so I updated it to only have a nominal monetary claim (get around issues I was having with calculated ad valorem fees over the original claim value) and emphasized the primary basis in Norwich relief.
Norwich relief entails clear duties to specifically intended beneficiaries seeking information from entities about people accused of harms mixed up in utilizing those entities to harm third-parties relative to such equitable relief sought. The problem is if a KYC failure did occur, what level of enforcement of accuracy of customer information can take place. Traditional Norwich precedent has to do with finding the identities of employees of companies or similar persons where the identities can be easily verified and where there isn't necessarily a question of whether such people can be fully identified for that reason. This is where I see such a Court (in this situation, Cayman Islands' system) needing to fashion some level of a custom equitable solution to account for any further research and validation if initial information is not accurate within a digital context (no verified identity or jumbled information). I.e., where a solution might entail requiring the information target to explain how it verified the data and if it still isn't accurate, to explain why it reasonably is still inaccurate and why it is not further correctable. Accuracy level is a very big risk with Binance since it was known to have intentionally sabotaged its own KYC regime to expand its business per the CFTC case against it, where it pled guilty.